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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Chad L. Wahl appeals from the district court’s denial of his Motion For
Relief From Judgment.1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Wahl pleaded guilty to felony Fleeing or Attempting to Elude a Peace
Officer, and he was sentenced to five years in prison with two years fixed. (R.,
pp. 48, 64-69.) At sentencing on July 26, 2004, the district court ordered that
Wahl pay restitution in the amount of $5,215. (R., pp. 64-69.) There is no
evidence in the record that the order was ever satisfied or recorded as a civil
judgment. (See, generally, R.)
The district court clerk filed a Felony Affidavit and Notice of Failure to Pay
on September 11, 2009, noting that restitution was still outstanding, and
requesting payment by October 12, 2009. (R., p. 70.)
On October 21, 2015, Wahl moved the district court for relief from the
restitution order. (R., pp. 79-81.) He reasoned that the order “was specifically
entered and ordered to be entered as a Judgment and was to be executed by
the victim as provided for by law as a Civil Judgment.” (R., p. 79.) Wahl also
cited I.C. § 10-1110, which, in the version existing in 2004, set forth a five-year
expiration timeframe for judgment liens. (R., p. 80.) Wahl concluded that, as a

Wahl’s Amended Notice of Appeal states that he is appealing from the denial of
the motion to reconsider but his briefing only addresses the district court’s
alleged errors in denying the original motion. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-5.)
1
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matter of law, “the Judgment expired after five, (5), years,” and was thus “null
and void.” (R., p. 80.)
The district court denied Wahl’s motion. (R., pp. 82-86.) The court found
that “[i]t is somewhat unclear what relief Wahl seeks,” and concluded that Wahl’s
motion failed for several procedural, substantive, and jurisdictional reasons. (R.,
p. 83-85.) Of note, the district court determined Wahl’s motion had not been
filed “within a ‘reasonable time’” as required by I.R.C.P. 60(c)(1). (R., p. 83.)
Wahl moved for reconsideration and the district court denied this motion
as well. (R., pp. 87-98.) Wahl thereafter appealed. (R., pp. 99-102.)
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ISSUES
Wahl states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Wahl’s motion for relief from the
restitution order entered in this case July 26, 2004?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1. Does this Court have jurisdiction to consider the merits of Wahl’s appeal?
2. Has Wahl failed to show that the order of restitution expired or is
unenforceable as a matter of law?
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ARGUMENT
I.
This Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction To Consider The Merits Of This Appeal
A.

Introduction
The district court entered its Order Denying Motion For Relief From

Judgment on October 29, 2015. (R., pp. 82-86.) Wahl filed his notice of appeal
83 days later on January 19, 2016. (R., pp. 99-103.) Because Wahl did not
timely file his notice of appeal his appeal must be dismissed.
B.

Standard Of Review
“‘A question of jurisdiction is fundamental; it cannot be ignored when

brought to [the appellate courts’] attention and should be addressed prior to
considering the merits of an appeal.’” State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80
P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003) (quoting H & V Engineering, Inc. v. Idaho State Bd. of
Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55,
57 (1987)). Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law that is freely
reviewed. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho at 483, 80 P.3d at 1084.
C.

Wahl’s Notice Of Appeal Was Not Timely Filed
An appeal “may be made only by physically filing a notice of appeal with

the clerk of the district court within 42 days from the date evidenced by the filing
stamp of the clerk of the court” on the order appealed from. I.A.R. 14(a). “The
failure to physically file a notice of appeal … with the clerk of the district court …
within the time limits prescribed” is a jurisdictional defect that requires automatic
dismissal of the appeal. I.A.R. 21; see also State v. Ciccone, 150 Idaho 305,
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306, 246 P.3d 958, 959 (2010) (citations omitted) (“The timely filing of a ‘notice
of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to challenge a decision made by a lower
court.’”).
Here, Wahl filed his notice of appeal 83 days after the file stamp date on
the order he appeals from. (R., pp. 82-86, 99-103.) Accordingly, his appeal
must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
D.

Wahl’s Untimely Motion For Reconsideration Did Not Extend The Time
For Filing The Appeal
The time for filing an appeal is tolled during the pendency of a timely

motion for reconsideration.

See I.A.R. 14(a) (time to file notice of appeal

“terminated” by the timely filing of a motion that “could affect the judgment, order
or sentence in the action.”). To be timely, a motion for reconsideration must be
filed within 14 days. I.A.R. 14(a). If such a motion is untimely it will not toll the
time for an appeal. See Ade v. Batten, 126 Idaho 114, 116, 878 P.2d 813, 815
(Ct. App. 1994) (reviewing Batten’s untimely filed motion to amend judgment and
holding “A Rule 59 motion to amend the judgment or a Rule 11(a)(2)(B) motion
for reconsideration, if timely made, would toll the time to file a notice of appeal.
Under the circumstances, however, the filing of Batten’s motion did not enlarge
the period of time for the direct appeal from the order on summary judgment.
I.A.R. 14(a).”).
Here, Wahl filed his motion to reconsider 53 days after the denial of his
request for relief. (R., pp. 82-96.) His motion to reconsider, made well past the
14-day limit, was therefore untimely and did not toll the time to file a notice of
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appeal. Moreover, Wahl’s motion to reconsider was also filed past the 42-day
time limit for filing his notice of appeal and therefore the order was final. In any
event, Wahl’s notice of appeal was not timely filed and his appeal should
therefore be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
II.
Wahl Has Failed To Show That The Restitution Order Expired Or Is
Unenforceable As A Matter Of Law
A.

Introduction
Even if this Court has jurisdiction, Wahl has shown no error.

Wahl

proffers one basis for relief from the restitution order: he cites I.C. § 10-1110 and
argues that the order is “null and void due to the State’s failure to comply with the
statute of limitations applicable to the collection of judgment liens.” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 5.) This argument fails because a restitution order is not a lien. Thus,
whether or not the order was ever recorded as a civil judgment, and whether or
not a lien attached to any of Wahl’s assets as a result, the purported expiration
of any such lien would have no effect on the order. Accordingly, Wahl’s motion
for relief fails as a matter of law.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court

exercises free review.” Grazer v. Jones, 154 Idaho 58, 63-64, 294 P.3d 184,
189-90 (2013).
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C.

The Restitution Order Has Not Expired As A Result Of A Lien Expiration
Statute, Because An Order Is Not A Lien
As a general matter, restitution is “due and owing at the time of

sentencing or at the date the amount of restitution is determined, whichever is
later.” I.C. § 19-5304(4). Collecting from such an order is “specifically entrusted
to the victim or the clerk of the district court.” State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167,
171-72, 345 P.3d 226, 230-31 (Ct. App. 2014); I.C. § 19-5305(2) (“The clerk of
the district court may take action to collect on the order of restitution on behalf of
the victim and, with the approval of the administrative district judge, may use the
procedures set forth in section 19-4708, Idaho Code, for the collection of the
restitution.”).
As an additional remedy, restitution orders “may be recorded as a
judgment and the victim may execute as provided by law for civil judgments.”
I.C.§ 19-5305(1) (emphasis added). If a victim chooses to record the order as a
civil judgment, “the judgment so recorded becomes a lien upon all real property
of the judgment debtor.”

I.C. § 10-1110.

In 2004, “[t]he lien resulting from

recording of a judgment other than for support of a child continues five (5) years
from the date of the judgment,” though the judgment could be renewed, thus
extended the life of the judgment lien by another five years. I.C. §§ 10-1110, 101111.
A restitution order is not the same thing as a judgment lien. See Grazer,
154 Idaho at 64-65, 294 P.3d at 190-91 (holding “[a] judgment lien is distinct
from the underlying judgment, and therefore the judgment does not expire
merely because the lien has expired”); Platts v. Pac. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
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Ass’n of Tacoma, 62 Idaho 340, 348–49, 111 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1941)
(“Expiration of the lien of a judgment does not extinguish the judgment. It simply
terminates the statutory security.” (emphasis in original)).
Here, the district court denied Wahl’s motion on several bases, including
that Wahl’s motion was not filed within a reasonable time per Rule 60(c)(1). (R.,
pp. 83-84.) Wahl has not shown this basis of the order erroneous. The district
court concluded that because Wahl waited 11 years after judgment to file his
motion, the motion was not filed within a reasonable time per Rule 60(c)(1). (R.,
pp. 83-84.)

And Wahl admits on appeal, “[t]he State notified Mr. Wahl on

September 11, 2009” regarding the unpaid restitution, and yet Wahl waited until
2015 to respond. (Appellant’s brief, p. 8.) His delay was not because he was
unaware of the order—as Wahl further admits on appeal he intentionally waited,
as a tactical decision, “in order to ensure that the five-year statute of limitations
set forth in Idaho Code § 10-1110 had expired, if it had not already done so.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.) But the correct “focus of reasonableness” in assessing
whether Wahl’s motion is timely is when he “first became aware” of the
restitution order compared to when he filed his motion. Lytle v. Lytle, 158 Idaho
639, 642, 350 P.3d 340, 343 (2015). Applying that standard, Wahl’s motion was
unreasonably late as he was aware of the restitution order long before he
requested relief from it.
Even if Wahl’s motion was timely, however, denial of the motion was the
correct result because there is an unsatisfied restitution order against Wahl, and
Wahl fails to show that the order has expired or is unenforceable as a matter of
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law. Here, there is a valid restitution order against Wahl. (R., pp. 65-67, 69.)
There is no evidence in the record that the order was ever satisfied, and the
district court clerk appropriately tried to collect on the order per I.C. § 19-5305(2)
(“The clerk of the district court may take action to collect on the order of
restitution on behalf of the victim….”) (emphasis added). (R., p. 70.) Moreover,
the restitution order is valid regardless of when it was originally entered, because
it is not a lien, and would not be affected by the lien expiration timelines found in
I.C. §10-1110.

Because I.C. § 10-1110 only provides when judgment liens

expire—and gives no such expiration date or “statute of limitations” with respect
to judgments or restitution orders—there is no factual or legal basis for the order
to have expired here, and no basis for striking it or barring collection from it.
Wahl submits that this Court should “remand this case to the district court
with instruction to grant” Wahl’s motion for relief, which sought “an order striking
the restitution order pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1110,” but therein lies the
problem.

(Appellant’s brief, p. 1-2 (emphasis added)).

This argument fails

because it ignores the distinction between orders and liens, and assumes that a
statute relating to the latter affects the former.

This confusion—treating the

restitution order as “null and void” or somehow unenforceable solely as a result
of a lien expiration statute—depends on analyzing the order as if it were a
judgment lien. It is not.

Wahl does not, and cannot, explain how a statute

setting forth expiration dates for judgment liens has any effect on an unsatisfied
order of restitution.

While a restitution order may be recorded as a civil
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judgment, creating a judgment lien, it simply does not follow that the expiration of
any such lien would thereafter affect the underlying order.
Moreover, Wahl premises his argument on a presumption that the order of
restitution here was recorded—but there is no evidence that it was. (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 1, 8 (recognizing the lack of “any evidence reflecting recordation” but
nevertheless asserting the order has “presumably been recorded as a
judgment”).) There is only evidence that an order exists, but Wahl presents no
evidence or argument as to why that order—as opposed to any presumed
liens—has expired or is otherwise unenforceable. Because Wahl has not shown
that the order of restitution ever expired, and has not shown that the expiration of
a lien would affect an underlying order, as a matter of law his motion for relief
was correctly denied.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s denial
of Wahl’s motion.
DATED this 28th day of July, 2016.
/s/ Kale D. Gans__________________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of July, 2016, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

KDG/dd

/s/ Kale D. Gans___________________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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